Abstract-The Rabin cryptosystem has been proposed protect the unique ID (UID) in radio-frequency identification tags. The Rabin cryptosystem is a type of lightweight public key system that is theoretically quite secure; however it is vulnerable to several side-channel attacks. In this paper, a crashing modulus attack is presented as a new fault attack on modular squaring during Rabin encryption. This attack requires only one fault in the public key if its perturbed public key can be factored. Our simulation results indicate that the attack is more than 50 percent successful with several faults in practical time. A complicated situation arises when reconstructing the message, including the UID, from ciphertext, i.e., the message and the perturbed public key are not relatively prime. We present a complete and mathematically rigorous message reconstruction algorithm for such a case. Moreover, we propose an exact formula to obtain a number of candidate messages. We show that the number is not generally equal to a power of two.
INTRODUCTION
IT is quite important that the modular squaring map fðxÞ ¼ There are various applications of the modular squaring map with N ¼ pq for large distinct primes p and q. For example, Blum et al. [1] constructed a unpredictable pseudorandom sequence to take the parity of x i for x i ¼ fðx iÀ1 Þ mod N with a secret initial value x 0 2 Z Ã N . This is known as the Blum-Blum-Shub pseudorandom number generator, and it is theoretically quite important. Another important example is the Rabin cryptosystem developed by Rabin [2] . The Rabin cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem with public key N and secret keys p and q. In this system, message M is encrypted as C ¼ M 2 mod N and decrypted as four possible roots of C using ffiffiffiffi C p mod p, ffiffiffiffi C p mod q and the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) (see Section 2.2).
The security of the Rabin cryptosystem, similar to that of RSA, is related to the practical difficulty of factoring N ¼ pq. The Rabin cryptosystem has a theoretical advantage in that there exists an exact proof of its security equivalent to factoring N, which is not currently known to be true for RSA. Being theoretically important, the Rabin cryptosystem is also useful for passive radio frequency identification (RFID). The use of passive RFID tags to prevent counterfeiting by embedding them in a product is an emerging application. RFID systems comprises tags and interrogators. RFID tags are low-cost wireless devices that associate a unique ID (UID) with the product. These tags are powered passively by the interrogator. Implementation of a public key cryptosystem on RFID tags is challenging, because the hardware limited. Therefore, "lightweight" cryptosystems are required for RFID tags. RSA is a well-known and effective public key cryptosystem; however, it is not suitable for RFID tags. RSA encryption requires many modular multiplications, relatively long processing time, and a relatively large data-path area. In addition, RSA consumes a significant amount of energy. There are two major lightweight public key cryptosystems suitable for RFID tags, i.e., the elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) and the Rabin cryptosystem.
ECC can be applied to small devices and has shorter processing time than RSA. Moreover, ECC is suitable for various RFID applications. Many academic papers on ECC for RFID tags have been published. For example, F€ urbass and Wolkerstorfer [3] , Lee et al. [4] , Hutter et al. [5] , Hutter et al. [6] , Hutter et al. [7] , Pessl and Hutter [8] , and Kern and Feldhofer [9] have reported remarkable results on ECC implementation for RFID tag chip.
The Rabin cryptosystem requires only one modular squaring, which is advantageous for use with RFID tags. Indeed, Oren and Feldhofer [10] , [11] , Arbit et al. [12] successfully applied Rabin encryption variant to RFID tags. The variant, known as WIPR (Weizmann-IAIK[Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications] Public Key for RFID) was developed by Naccache [13] and Shamir [14] , [15] . WIPR is smaller, faster, and requires less power than ECC implementations. Giesecke & Devrient GmbH [16] proposed the Rabin-Montgomery Cryptosystem (RAMON), a public key protocol for RFID tags based on the Rabin cryptosystem. RAMON uses Montgomery reduction [17] to avoid trial division. Therefore, it is very likely that the Rabin cryptosystem will be implemented on various types of RFID tag chips.
Since the publication of Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton's landmark paper [18] , differential fault analysis (DFA) has been an active area in cryptography. DFA is a technique to extract secret information from a cryptographic device by provoking a computational fault. DFA is a real threat for cryptographic devices, such as smartcard [19] ; therefore, a vast number of research papers about DFA have been published. The monograph edited by Joye and Tunstall [20] is a good guide to this field.
However, conventional fault attack research for public key cryptosystems has focused on DFA for smartcards, particularly signature schemes using RSA and ECC. Little attention has been paid to Rabin cryptosystem implemented on an RFID tag chip. We propose a powerful fault attack by one-byte perturbation of public key N based on the assumption that an attacker can induce faults as the device moves one byte of N from non-volatile memory to a register. Under this assumption, the attacker can create a new faulted public keyN ¼ p e 1 1 p e 2 2 Á Á Á p ev v , where p j are mutually distinct primes and e j are positive integers. This type of fault also can be generated directly by violating the register value. Indeed, in Brier et al. [21] , this type of fault model has been fully validated experimentally with fault-injection laser techniques.
We provide a mathematical analysis and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed fault attack through simulation. Although there have been some related studies [22] , [23] , they are not directly applicable to our target. An attack against RSA, first developed by Seifert [22] and extended to the general case by Muir et al. [23] , can obtain a new secret exponent e À1 mod 'ðNÞ, where e is a public exponent and ' is Euler's totient function. This approach is not applicable to Rabin cryptosystems; therefore, a secret message M including UID must be reconstructed directly. Conversely, it is known that an attacker can obtain modular quadratic equation M 2 C ðmodNÞ by solving each M 2 C ðmod p e j j Þ and computing M using CRT only if gcdðM;NÞ ¼ 1 holds. However, generally, some prime factors ofN are small. As a result, cases in which gcdðM;NÞ 6 ¼ 1 occur frequently. We also present a complete mathematical method to reconstruct the message in such cases.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief description of quadratic residues, the Rabin cryptosystem, and basic facts about the target implementation of a Rabin cryptosystem in an RFID tag. Section 3 presents the general principle and procedure of our attack, as well as a complete and mathematically rigorous message reconstruction algorithm. We show an exact formula to obtain the number of candidate message in Section 4. Simulated attack results are presented in Section 5, and conclusions are presented in Section 6.
PRELIMINARIES

Quadratic Residues
Let p be an odd prime. An integer C 2 Z Ã p is called a quadratic residue mod p if there exists x such that x 2 C ðmod pÞ. We denote the set of all quadratic residues mod p by QR p . We can use Euler's criterion to claim that C 2 C C ðmod pÞ. If p 6 3 ðmod 4Þ, i.e., p 1 ðmod 4Þ, then we require the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm to find the square roots. The Tonelli-Shanks algorithm runs in polynomial time assuming that the generalized Riemann hypothesis is true. We can find the roots mod p e of C as follows. First, we find all square roots mod p. Then using the Hensel lift (see e.g., Section 13.3.2 of Shoup's book [24] ), we lift each of these square roots to obtain all of the roots p 2 , and then lift these to obtain all square roots mod p 3 , and so on. Quadratic residue can be generalized for the mod of an odd composite number N ¼ p 
Rabin Cryptosystem
The Rabin cryptosystem [2] is a public key system based on the factorization difficulty of N ¼ pq where p and q are large and distinct balanced primes. The length n of N must be greater than or equal to 1,024 to be safe. N is its public key, and p and q are its secret keys. To reduce decryption complexity, choose p and q that satisfy p q 3 ðmod 4Þ should be chosen. According to the Dirichlet's theorem on arithmetic progressions (see, e.g., Theorem 5.52 of Shoup's book [24] ), infinitely many prime numbers p that satisfy p 3 ðmod 4Þ exist. Let Z Ã N ¼ ðZ=NZÞ Ã be the reduced residue system mod N. Generally, the plaintext M 2 Z Ã N is generated from a shorter message, including the UID, in our case. In the Rabin cryptosystem, to encrypt M 2 Z Ã N , the sender computes its square mod N
To decrypt the ciphertext C, the receiver computes its square roots ffiffiffiffi C p of C mod N using p and q as follows. First, compute
4 mod q using an efficient exponentiation algorithm. Second, using the CRT, the four roots are computed as follows:
Finally, the receiver recognizes the valid plaintext based on its format, such as redundancy and structure. The Rabin cryptosystem has two significant advantages with respect to alternative public key schemes. First, it is provably difficult to factor N. Second, it imposes a small computational burden, has relatively lightweight implementation, and requires only a single squaring and modular reduction for encryption.
WIPR Scheme
The most time consuming process of Rabin encryption is division by N because it is a RAM-intensive process. There are two wellknown ways to avoid division. One is using Montgomery reduction [17] , and the other is using the WIPR scheme. When we use Montgomery reduction, we compute
where N is n-bits long; therefore, it is simply a data format problem. Conversely, the WIPR scheme includes an essentially different process. Thus, we describe only the WIPR scheme.
To reduce the division process, Naccache [13] and Shamir [14] , [15] proposed a variant by replacing the modular multiplication by adding a large random multiple of N, where the size of the random number r is at least 80 bits longer than the size of N
Obviously, C 0 C ðmod NÞ, and C 0 is fully randomized. The decryption process is identical to Rabin's original process. This randomized variant of Rabin's scheme is easier to implement because it has only multiplications without modular reduction. It is lighter than the original Rabin scheme; however, it requires a register that is approximately twice as long for the ciphertext.
The WIPR scheme replaces r with the output of a light stream cipher, which was developed by Oren-Feldhofer [10] . This stream cipher is implemented by creating a Feistel network. Arbit et al. [12] reported that their successful implementation had a datapath area of 4,184 gate equivalents, an encryption time of 180 ms and an average power consumption of 11 mW.
We describe the WIPR challenge-response protocol as follows.
1) Challenge: The interrogator sends the challenge (random bit string) c of length s to the tag. 2) Response: The RFID tag generates two random bit strings R tag and r, where jR tag j ¼ n À s À jUIDj, and jrj ¼ n þ t. The tag generates a message as follows:
where jj denotes concatenation operator, and transmits the following ciphertext:
and BYTE_MIX is a simple byte-interleaving operation (see for details). (3) Verify: The interrogator decrypts C 0 using the secret key ðp; qÞ and finds the correct message, including the UID, in four square roots. Here, s and t are security parameters (originally set to s ¼ t ¼ 80). Note that using the Rabin function fðxÞ ¼ x 2 mod N to encrypt a message M that satisfies jMj < n requires some kind of random padding. Some padding schemes with short random padding are vulnerable to attacks based on Coppersmith's Theorem for a univariate polynomial [25] and Franklin and Reiter's related message attack [26] , [27] .
PROPOSED ATTACK 3.1 Principle
In the following, we consider only the WIPR protocol for convenience. The fundamental idea of our attack method uses perturbed public keyN of N. In this case, the ciphertext changes as follows:
Generally, the attacker cannot factor the coprime N in realistic time. Conversely, a perturbationN of N can be factored at high probability. If the attacker has factoredN successfully, such aŝ N ¼ p 
Equation (2) can be solved using the Tonelli-Shanks algorithm and the Hensel lift. CRT leads us to all roots of (1) from the roots M jk ðk ! 2Þ of (2), i.e., we obtain:
v roots, and these roots contain the correct message including the UID. The number of roots exceeds 2 v in some cases depending on the values of gcdðĈ; p e j j Þ for j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; v. We discuss these problems in Sections 3.4 and 4.
Fault Models
The WIPR protocol requires two online multiplications to compute
Optimal implementation of WIPR with 1,024 bit N was shown by Arbit et al. [12] . This multiplication process is performed on a multiply-accumulate register by convolution. Assuming a word size of one byte, a single multiply-accumulate register perform this multiplication in approximately 2 16 steps. The public key N moves from non-volatile memory to the register byte by byte. We assume that the attacker can inject a one-byte fault into this data moving process. In this paper, we consider two fault models.
Crash a byte of N
The first fault model that we choose to perform our attack with is derived from those used by Berzati et al. [28] , [29] to successfully attack standard RSA.
Here let Z½a; b be a set of integers in the interval ½a; b. We assume that the attacker can inject a transient fault that public key N modifies by byte, that is, the injected fault affects only one byte of the public key by modifying it randomly as follows:
where È is bitwise exclusive OR and ¼ R i Á 2 8i , R i 2 Z½1; 2 8 À 1 for i 6 ¼ 0 which is required to preserve the parity ofN. We assume the attacker knows the position i, but the correct value of the faulty public keyN is unknown by the attacker. The attacker must factor 255 (¼ 2 8 À 1) candidates ofN. Our attack also works for a fault that affects several bytes of N. However, the attacker's task grows in proportion to the number of candidatesN of perturbed N. This is a natural assumption for both WIPR and RAMON. In the WIPR case, the attack target is the time at which the ith byte N½i of N moves from non-volatile memory to the register for multiplication before multiplying r and N. In the RAMON case, the fault is injected while N moves from non-volatile memory, such as EEPROM, to a register at the transfer time of the ith byte prior to Montgomery squaring M 2 R À1 mod N.
Instruction skip
The second fault model is based on the instruction skip technique. Instruction skip is equivalent to replacing an instruction with a no operation in assembly language. Several researchers have investigated DFA using an instruction skip, or a bypass operation [30] , [31] , [32] . Instruction skip does not affect the registers, internal memory, and calculation process. Successful instruction skip attacks have been reported for PIC16F877 [30] , ATmega 128 [31] , and ATmega 168 [32] microcontrollers. Choukri and Tunstall [30] and Park et al. [31] showed that an entire Advanced Encryption Standard secret key could be reconstructed by skipping a branch instruction used to check the number of rounds. Kaminaga et al. [33] showed that it is possible to reconstruct an entire secret exponent with 63ð¼ 2 6 À 1Þ faulted signatures in a short time for a 1536-bit RSA implementation with the 2 6 -ary method using instruction skipping technique in precomputation phase.
Our attack target is a conditional branch operation for moving the last byte of N at the counter i ¼ 127. If the conditional branch operation is skipped, the attacker obtains the faulted public keyN as follows:
where each N½i 2 Z½0; 255. Clearly,N is one byte shorter than the original N, and preserves its parity. In this case,N is uniquely determine. Therefore, from the computational point of view, attack for this case is easier than the attack for the 'crash a byte of N' case.
Attack Procedure
The attacker's goal is to reconstruct the secret message M, including the UID. The following steps provide an example of our attack process for 'crash a byte of N'.
Step 1. Create a perturbed public keyN by injecting a fault to a byte of the public key N. Step 2 is the most time consuming process in computation for the attacker. Most ofN k ðk ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 255Þ have relatively small factors; thus, these can be factored in a short time. However, some cases require more time to factorN k . Then, the attacker shifts the position of the target byte and attempt the factoring process again.
Step 3 is a technical process, and we must consider the degenerate case, gcdðĈ;N k Þ 6 ¼ 1. Mathematicians have paid little attention to the degenerate case; however, such case arises in our attack.
Reconstruction of Roots
Our attack method comes down to finding all roots of the following modular quadratic equation with a square numberĈ
where p is an odd prime and e is a positive integer. The oddness of p obeys the fact that our attack targets a byte of N that is not the lowest byte. We use assumption (A), i.e.,Ĉ is squared mod p e , throughout this paper. Assumption (A) is very natural becausê C M 2 ðmod p e j j Þ is derived from our target equationĈ ¼ M 2 þ rN.
We denoteĈ modN byĈ. The algorithm for finding the roots of (4) depends on whether gcdðp;ĈÞ ¼ 1. We distinguish the "degenerate" case gcdðĈ;NÞ 6 ¼ 1 from the "non-degenerate" case gcdðĈ;NÞ ¼ 1.
Non-Degenerate Case
Here, letĈ M 2 ðmodNÞ for some M 2 Z. For gcdðp;ĈÞ ¼ 1, finding the roots of (4) is not difficult (see e.g., Section 2.8.2 of Shoup's book [34] ).
Theorem 1 (Theorem 2.25 [34] ). If gcdðp;ĈÞ ¼ 1, then the modular quadratic Equation (4) is equivalent to x AEM ðmod p e Þ. In particular, (4) has only two roots.
Proof. Here, we show the proof for Theorem 1. Since gcdðM; pÞ ¼ 1, there exists the inverse M À1 mod p. Therefore, (4) is equivalent to ðxM À1 Þ 2 1 ðmod p e Þ. Let g be xM À1 , and we obtain ðg þ 1Þðg À 1Þ 0 ðmod p e Þ:
Thus, there exists non-negative integers
Then, 2 ¼ ðg þ 1Þ À ðg À 1Þ divides p if both d 1 and d 2 are positive, which leads to a contradiction because p is an odd prime, therefore, (4) are given by:
ðmod p e Þ;
where ' is Euler's totient function.
Proof. It is easy to verify (5) directly. From Theorem 1, the number of roots of (4) .
t u
For p 1 ðmod 4Þ, we first solve the following equation:
We require the Tonneli-Shanks algorithm to solve (7) . The Tonneli-Shanks algorithm can be described as follows. (7), the roots can be lifted to mod p u ðu > 1Þ using the following. Furthermore, this x is unique in mod p kþm , and can be represented explicitly as
The division by p k denotes ordinary integer division, and the inversion
Degenerate Case
Here we consider the degenerate case, i.e., gcdðĈ;NÞ 6 ¼ 1.
Theorem 4. All roots of the modular quadratic equation
where y is a root of y 2 a ðmod p eÀ' Þ. In particular, the number of its roots is 2p '=2 .
Proof. Note that ' must be even under assumption (A). Let x ¼ yp t such that gcdðy; pÞ ¼ 1, and substitute x into the quadratic equation; thus, we obtain
Suppose that 2t < ', y 2 ap 'À2t ðmod p eÀ2t Þ holds, which means that y is a multiple of p and is contradictory. Conversely, suppose that 2t > ', y 2 p 2tÀ' a ðmod p eÀ' Þ holds, which means that a is a multiple of p and is contradictory. Therefore, 2t ¼ ' holds, and we obtain
From Theorem 1, (8) has only two roots in modulo p eÀ' . Therefore, the root x of x 2 ap ' ðmod p e Þ can be represented as
for some b 2 Z. (9) satisfies x 2 ap ' ðmod p e Þ. Then, we have
ð2yþ bp eþ'=2 Þ ðmod p e Þ. We learn 2by 0 ðmod p '=2 Þ. Since p is odd and y is invertible, b is a multiple of
into (9), we reach
Since only two y satisfy (8) , the number of x is 2p '=2 . t u Remark 1. The degenerate case occurs frequently whenN has a small prime factor. Therefore, in many cases, we can easily find the desired roots by brute force without using Hensel's lifting lemma.
NUMBER OF CANDIDATES OF MESSAGE
We really need for the perturbed public keyN is to be easily factorable. After factoring, the problem breaks down to find the roots of the modular quadratic equation. Complexity of finding square roots modN depends on prime factor decomposition ofN. It is well known that the following asymptotic estimate for QðxÞ, which is the number of square-free numbers below x.
Theorem 7 (Theorem 333, Hardy and Write [35] , p. 355).
This estimate tells us that the probability that a number should be square-free is approximated as 
The equality holds in (10) if and only if gcdðĈ;NÞ ¼ 1. Therefore, Theorems 6 and 7 mean that the probability that the inequality (10) holds is greater than or equal to 6 p 2 asymptotically. The asymptotic behavior of vðNÞ is described by Theorem 8. [36] ). The function ðvðnÞ À ln ln nÞ= ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi ln ln n p is normally distributed in the sense that, for any fixed z, one has
Theorem 8 (Erd€ os and Kac
ffiffiffiffiffi ffi 2p p dz;
as T ! 1, where we denote the cardinality of a set A as ]A.
Theorem 8 tells us the distribution of vðNÞ obeys normal distribution with mean ln lnN and variance ln lnN. We use the rough estimate vðNÞ % ln lnð2 1024 Þ ¼ 6:564959 for 1,024-bitN. However, convergence is slow because the term ln lnN increases very slowly asN becomes large. Since both WIPR and RAMON uses at least an 80 bit challenge, the probability that a candidate correct message M has the same data format accidentally is less than or equal to 1=2 80 . According to the above mathematical observations, it is quite rare that plural candidates of M will appear.
SIMULATION OF FACTORIZINGN
Purpose of Simulation
As we discussed in Section 3.3, the attacker needs to factorize fault public keyN after a fault injection. There are 255 candidates ofN (see Step 2 in Section 3.3). One concern is a required time for factorizing thoseN candidates. If it is computationally hard to factorize, another fault injection may be required for differentN. The tradeoff clearly exists between the required number of fault injections and the computational power of factorization. Therefore, in this section, successful rates of factorization are evaluated by computer simulation.
Evaluation Method
The evaluation procedure is as follows. Note that Steps (0) through (1b) are based on 'crash a byte of N' model.
Step (0): Assume a 1,024 bit N (128 bytes) randomly. Let
Step (1a): Assume fault position j. j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 126 randomly.
Step (1b): Assume fault pattern k 0 . k 0 ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 255 at random. As a notation,
Step ( Step (4): k ¼ k þ 1. When k < 256, go back to Step (2a); otherwise, proceed to Step (6).
Step (5): The attack is successful. Simulation ends.
Step (6): The attack is in fail. Simulation ends.
Above steps are repeated 195 times for averaging successful rate of factorization.
Results
Using a desktop PC with a Core i7-2600 CPU at 3.4 GHz with 12 GB RAM, the simulation runs on Mathematica 9 for Windows 7 Pro 64 bit. If this simulation ends at Step (5), the attacker can find the correct message, i.e., the attack is successful.
Otherwise, it ends at Step (6), which means the attack has failed. As a result, 28 cases were successful among 195 simulated processes, which is an 14.4 percent success rate. According to this result, attack with X fault injections has a success rate of 1 À 0:856 X . The success rate is 54 percent for X ¼ 5. Fig. 1 shows the distribution of time consumed T per single attack. For successful factorization for trueN, the mean T is 115.4 min, the median is 136.8 min, and the standard deviation is 78.1 min. For failed factorization, the mean, median, and standard deviation of T are 226.4 min, 226.6 min, and 4 min, respectively. T can be 255 min at most. However, when factorization finishes within 1 min, T will be less than 255 min. Moreover, the attack is complete when the correct message is found; thus, T becomes much less than 255 min. if the factorized fault pattern k is the true fault pattern, k 0 . The distribution of the number of successful factorizations, c is shown in Fig. 2 . Here, c is 30.91 on average for failed attack cases. For successful attacks, the factorization will break at Step (3); therefore, it does not reach the final fault pattern k ¼ 255 with high probability. Thus, the successful factorization rate is estimated as 30:91=255 % 12:1 percent. In this simulation, the time limit for the factorization process is 1 min at Step (2a), which is just an example. The time limit for factorization would be optimized by considering total attack time and/or the cost of fault injections. This issue will be the focus of future study.
Note that, according to our simulation results on 'instruction skip' case at Section 3.2.2, successful factorization rate is 118 1000 ¼ 11:8 percent, which is almost the same as the above rate.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a powerful fault attack technique against a Rabin cryptosystem implemented in a passive RFID tag chip. Our attack uses one byte perturbationN of public key N. One difficulty with our attack is how to reconstruct the message M, including the UID, when gcdðM;NÞ 6 ¼ 1. We have provided a complete algorithm to reconstruct M for such cases. This attack requires only one fault in the public key if its perturbed public key can be factored. The most time consuming process of our attack is the factorization ofN. Empirically, the successful factorization rate is estimated as 12.1 percent ofN, even if factorization is limited within 1 min using a desktop PC. When this process takes too much time, another fault injection is preferable.
